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1869

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE MAVERICK BRIDGE.

[PROPOSED.]

ARGUMENT

BEFORE THE

U. S. COMMISSIONERS,


AT THE

CHARLESTOWN NAVY YARD,

SEPTEMBER 16, TO OCTOBER 7, 1868.

BY WILLIAM W. WHEILDON.

With an Appendix.



CHARLESTOWN :

PRESS OF THE BUNKER HILL AURORA.

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PRELIMINARY NOTE.

THE Legislature of Massachusetts, at its annual session in 1868, passed an act to authorize the erection of a bridge across the "water between the mainland in the city of Boston and East Boston," upon such a plan and mode of construction as the Mayor and Aldermen, "on consultation with the Harbor Commissioners shall direct or approve."

The Committee of the Legislature, to whom the subject was referred, after a hearing of parties, believed to be somewhat incomplete, declined to report a bill in favor of the project, and subsequently the friends of the measure obtained leave of the House of Representatives to introduce a bill, which was finally passed over the veto of the Governor and became a law of the State according to the terms of the Constitution.

As the line of the proposed structure is over the navigable waters of the harbor, in relation to which the government of the United States has absolute control, the parties deemed it necessary to obtain the consent of Congress to the measure before proceeding with the work of construction. Application was therefore made to Congress, at its next session, for the assent of the government to the proposed Maverick Bridge. Coming before Congress in this

form, after a brief investigation of the subject the following Joint Resolution was passed and approved by the President :

In the Senate of the United States,
July 1, 1868.

Joint Resolution : in relation to the Bridge in Boston Harbor.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy shall detail two competent and impartial officers of the Navy, and the Secretary of War shall detail a competent and impartial officer of the Engineer Corps, who shall compose a Commission, whose duty it shall be to make a careful examination of the harbor of Boston, and shall report to Congress, at its next session, in what manner the commerce of said harbor and the interests of the United States in the Navy Yard at Charlestown, will be affected by the construction of a bridge over the water between the mainland in the city of Boston and East Boston, in the manner provided in an act of the legislature of the State of Massachusetts, entitled " An act to incorporate the Maverick Bridge Company ;" and no bridge shall be erected by said company across said water until the assent of Congress shall be given thereto.

Passed by the House of Representatives, July 1, 1868.

Under this authority, Rear Admirals S. H. STRINGHAM and CHAS. H. BELL, and Brevet Brigadier General J. H. SIMPSON of the Engineer Corps, were appointed to compose the commission.

The Commission assembled at the rooms of the Naval Library and Institute, Charlestown Navy Yard, on the 16th September, 1868, and continued its sessions until 7th October. Judge WRIGHT and Mr. EMERY of Boston, appeared for the Bridge Corporation ; WM. W. WHEILDON for the City of Charlestown and other parties ; JAMES B. THAYER for the Tudor Co. and Wharf Owners in Boston. There were also present at times during the

hearing, Mr. QUINCY, Mr. SEWALL and Mr. LINCOLN, of the Harbor Commissioners; Mr. HILL, of the Board of Trade; Mayor SANDERS, of Cambridge; Dr. J. E. BARTLETT, President of the Mystic River Corporation, and others.

On the first day of the session the Commissioners announced their determination to hear first the friends of the bridge, and to be furnished with a plan and location of the proposed structure, in order that they might have something definite before them; but through the whole hearing this direction of the Commissioners was avoided and not complied with. The Board adjourned from Thursday to Monday, 21st, and again from Monday to Thursday, 24th, at the request of the friends of the bridge. On the 24th, they were not ready, and Mr. Emery presented a series of points for the Commissioners to decide. The Commission again decided to have presented to them definitely the location of the bridge, its general form and character, and to receive evidence pertaining to the subjects referred to them. The advantages and benefits of the bridge to other interests, to increase the value of real estate or vacant lands, did not come within the scope of their inquiry. On Friday, Judge Wright formally presented his case, by argument and explanation of several plans, after which the Commissioners decided that he should present a written statement on Monday.

On Monday morning, 28th, Judge Wright read a statement in behalf of the corporators, stating that they had not made a location and had not adopted any plan of a bridge, and could not furnish any without consultation with the Mayor and Aldermen of Boston, and the Harbor Commissioners, and that if a plan were furnished it might be premature and labor lost. The plans which had been shown were those used before the legislative committee. Judge Wright then proceeded to explain T. Willis Pratt's plan of a bridge, which Mr. Pratt himself and Judge Wright himself had severally previously done, ending as before with the statement that the corporation did not commit itself to that plan or to any other. Here it was supposed the case for the bridge was concluded, and the Commissioners requested the opponents of the bridge to proceed with their testimony.

The Commission had been in session for three weeks, the friends of the bridge having consumed an unusual share of the time by their delays, while not a day was granted to or asked for by the opposing parties. The latter went on with the hearing, at the request of the Commissioners, holding in their hands at the time, a written protest against the incomplete and indefinite manner in which the bridge case had been presented by the exhibition and explanation of plans and projects which they expressly declined to sanction or approve. In consideration of the wish of the Board to proceed with the hearing, the protest was not placed on file, and the parties opposed to the bridge proceeded with the case, withholding nothing necessary to it.

Tuesday, 29th, was occupied by Mr. Wheildon ; Wednesday, by Mr. Thayer ; Thursday, by the Harbor Commissioners ; Friday, by Mr. Matthews, President of the Winnisemmet Co., and by Dr. Bartlett, President of the Mystic River Corporation ; on Saturday Mr. Wheildon presented a letter from Collector Russell.

On Monday, Mr. Thayer presented a remonstrance from Boston merchants, and Mr. Wheildon a communication from Prof. Peiree ; on Tuesday, Mr. Hill read a report from the Board of Trade, and a valuable paper from Com. Rodgers was read.

On Wednesday, which had been named as probably the last day of the hearing, Mr. Wright again appeared with a mass of papers, composed largely of extracts from various printed reports of committees, engineers and others, in relation to the commercial importance of East Boston, and other extracts relative to the building of bridges and their superiority for certain purposes over ferries. Mr. Wright then proceeded at length, by an elaborate written argument, with certificates and memorials from interested parties, to controvert and call in question statements put in on the other side, and especially those made by Gen. Foster, Prof. Peiree, the Harbor Commissioners and others, commenting upon some of these in such severe and unjustifiable terms as to call forth remarks from the Commissioners and other parties in the room.

The course of proceeding, on the part of the counsel for the bridge

was objected to, and especially the unfair manner in which he had avoided the direction of the Commissioners, by withholding his whole case until the testimony on the other side had mostly been given in, gaining to himself by a trick the closing of the hearing ; thus depriving the other side of any opportunity to answer his arguments, expose their fallacy, show the misapplication of authorities, and the errors of statement. No attention was paid to these objections, nor any suggestion made in regard to the offensive language towards Prof. Peirce. After a brief consultation, the Commissioners, by the exercise of a degree of courtesy to which he had no claim, the counsel was allowed to proceed and finish his statement. One of the gentlemen on the opposite side, immediately rose to make some reply, and ask for an opportunity to be heard ; but the President of the Board decided that the hearing was closed and no attempt was made to press anything further upon the Commissioners,—so that a portion of the following argument was not read to the Commissioners or placed on their files.

ARGUMENT.

MR. PRESIDENT AND

GENTLEMEN OF THE COMMISSION :

As this is not to be regarded in any sense as a judicial proceeding, but simply as a Commission of Inquiry, it will not be expected that I should follow the remarks of the counsel for the bridge, (who was checked by the President in his argument,) in his exaltation of the Maverick Bridge and the important consequences to follow in the distant future from its erection. I expect to be held by the rulings and limitations of the Commission, or overstepping these, to be called back to the record. It will be my endeavor in no degree to transgress upon the determinations of the Commission.

DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.

The duties of the Commission are distinctly set forth in the joint resolution of Congress, under which it was appointed, namely, "to make a careful examination of the harbor of Boston," and "report to Congress, at its next session, in what manner the commerce of said harbor and the interests of the United States in the Navy Yard at Charlestown, will be affected by the construction of a bridge over the water between the mainland in the city of Boston and East Boston, in the manner provided in an act of the legislature of Massachusetts," &c., and it is added, "and no bridge shall be

erected by said company across said water until the assent of Congress shall be given thereto."

By these terms and limitations, the duty of the Commissioners is primarily to make an examination of the harbor of Boston, for two specific purposes, namely, 1, to ascertain "in what manner the commerce of said harbor," and 2, "the interests of the United States in the Navy Yard at Charlestown, will be affected by the construction of a bridge over the water between the mainland in the city of Boston and East Boston," and secondly, make report of the same to Congress.

AUTHORITY OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

The right of the general government to paramount control over the navigable waters of the country, is not in this case to be considered an open question. Its authority under the constitutional powers to regulate commerce, is admitted by all commentators on the Constitution of the United States, and has been repeatedly settled by decisions of the highest courts of law; and finally in this case, by the direct exercise of the power of Congress, in the passage of the resolution already quoted, forbidding the erection of the proposed bridge.

If this were not so—if Congress had not complete and unquestioned control over Boston harbor as a portion of the navigable waters of the country, open under necessary restrictions to the commerce of the world,—then it had no just power to authorize this Commission, and its proceedings would be of no validity or force, even were its recommendations to be adopted. Fortunately, as has already been said, the case is perfectly clear and the right and authority, and it may be added the duty of Congress in the matter, is unquestionable. In order to its future action on this subject, it authorized this Commission, which will report to Congress at its approaching session.

From what has been said by the President, I presume the Commission expect me, this morning, to present the case of the City of Charlestown; but this I have proposed to myself to defer to a later period in the hearing. The interests of the City of Charlestown,

as a municipality, are general and not particular or individual. Her relations to the commerce of the harbor are of vital importance to her business and prosperity, and are to be presented by statement and argument, rather than statistics, which pertain especially to individual ownership and enterprise.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL FOSTER.

The statement read before the Commission yesterday, from Maj. Gen. FOSTER, a gentleman so well known to the members of this Board and so intimately associated in service with one of them, was so full and complete in reference to the character of the proposed bridge, and its effects upon the harbor, its navigation and anchorage, and upon the great proportion of the commerce of the port to be interrupted by it, that it renders somewhat unnecessary a considerable amount of testimony which might otherwise be presented to the Board. The statement of Gen. FOSTER received, also, perhaps unwittingly, so cordial and hearty, and I have no doubt sincere an endorsement—just I know it was—from the gentleman on the other side, that, almost alone, it seemed conclusively to answer both questions of inquiry submitted by Congress to this Commission. And I desire, at this time, to call the attention of the Commission to the fact that the statements made by Gen. FOSTER are, in their essential particulars, confirmed by the testimony of Prof. PEIRCE, the present head of the United States Coast Survey, whose attendance here I hope the Commission will invite before the hearing is closed.* The opinions of Prof. PEIRCE, so far as they have been given by him on the subject, are briefly stated in the message of the Governor to the Legislature, referred to by Gen. FOSTER and in possession of the Commission. I also desire to say, in this connection, that the views of Mr. JAMES B. FRANCIS, of Lowell, one of the ablest and most reliable civil engineers in the country, not connected with the Engineer Corps of the United

* At a subsequent stage of the hearing, a communication from Prof. PEIRCE was presented and read by Mr. WHEILDON.

States, as expressed in the legislature of Massachusetts, during the pendency of the bridge bill, will as soon as received, be presented to the Board and will be found to be in complete concurrence with the views so ably presented by Gen. FOSTER and confirmed by Prof. PEIRCE.*

On some of the most essential points, therefore, in this inquiry, the testimony referred to, must be regarded as most complete and satisfactory—so that, in fact, it only remains for the parties opposed to this bridge to show the nature and character of the commerce of Boston harbor to be affected by it, its extent and importance, and the wrong it will do to cities, towns, corporations and individuals, whose rights and privileges, enjoyed for centuries, are to be impaired or destroyed by it.

IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE.

Commerce, if not the very basis of the wealth and prosperity of the country, is one of the most important means of both, and in this is found the reason why all the great interests in this part of the Commonwealth, even to a greater distance from Boston than at first appears, are opposed to the erection of a barrier, whatever may be its peculiar character as to form or structure, across an important portion of Boston harbor. Not only the immediate interests of navigation, wharf property, shipbuilding and the trades, employments and traffic attendant upon these, but large producing, manufacturing, warehousing and transportation interests, near and remote, are equally opposed and almost equally to be prejudiced by the obstruction to commerce, contemplated in the grant for the erection of the Maverick Bridge. Whatever may be said to the contrary, these all regard an additional impediment to the navigation of Boston harbor, as a measure fraught with trouble, delay, expense and danger,—to be annually increased, if commerce increases; to be tediously endured, if commerce should, as it most probably would do, diminish under the annoyance and cost.

* A report of the speech of Mr. FRANCIS was presented by Mr. THAYER, and a letter from Mr. FRANCIS, endorsing the printed report was presented by Mr. WHEILDON.

FITCHBURG RAILROAD CORPORATION.

The members of the Commission must have observed, since their arrival in this vicinity, if not before known to them, that four of the great railroad lines of Massachusetts, starting from Boston, cross the Charles River above two or more of the present bridges, and are in some sense as long wharves to the interior towns, in northerly, northwesterly, and northeasterly directions. These railroad lines are the Fitchburg, Boston and Maine, Eastern and Lowell. Their passenger depots and freight houses are in the city of Boston, excepting the Fitchburg road, whose freight houses are in Charlestown, and the Eastern whose freight houses are at East Boston ; but a large portion of the heavy freighting business of three of these great railroad lines is done on their wharves and roadways in Charles River, and cannot be conveniently, if at all, done anywhere else. It will appear by statements which will be presented to the Board that not less than one thousand cargoes of freight, of the most bulky merchandize, which could not possibly be accommodated in any other part or portion of Boston harbor, at however much additional cost of wharfage, transportation and delivery, are annually landed on these wharves and forwarded by railroad trains to Lowell, Lawrence, Fitchburg and numerous other towns in and beyond the borders of the State. This great commerce is carried on almost entirely by coasting vessels, comprising barques, brigantines, three-masted schooners and schooners, and consists chiefly of coal, lumber, lime, salt, plaster, pig iron, bricks, sand, stone, &c., and occasional cargoes of railroad iron. These vessels are now compelled to pass through two, three, four and five bridges, viz :

Fitchburg,	through	2 bridges.
Boston & Maine,	“	3 “
Eastern,	“	4 “
Lowell,	“	5 “

To accommodate the 512 vessels which landed cargoes on the Fitchburg wharves, in 1867, the draws of two bridges were required

to be opened one thousand and twenty-four times each, or together two thousand and forty-eight times. Of these 512 vessels, 204 had cargoes of coal, the price of which was increased to the consumer by the charge of three cents per ton for each bridge, making the amount paid for that year on the article of coal alone, delivered on the wharves of the Fitchburg railroad, \$4,564.52. For the same amount delivered to the Boston & Maine road, the charge would be \$6,846.28, and if at the Lowell Railroad, it would amount to \$11,413.80.

The proposed bridge across the harbor, if erected, would have the effect largely to increase these amounts, for whatever means were adopted to facilitate the passage of vessels through the draw, there would inevitably be much delay, both from their number and the necessity of making the further passage amidst baffling winds towards the first bridge over Charles River ; or if steam tugs were employed for this purpose, the cost of the cargo, whether lumber or coal, would be further considerably increased. So that a bridge so far below any of the present bridges, could not be passed by vessels going farther up, at the ordinary rate of three cents per ton for coal, and charges for other cargoes proportional to that ; the shippers' charge could hardly be less, to cover expenses and delay, than four times three cents ; and would inevitably prove in the case of vessels bound to the limit of navigation, absolutely prohibitory. Judging from the data presented it would seem that this result must follow.

Without any additional obstruction to navigation, in the harbor or river, the increase of commercial business connected with the Fitchburg Railroad, is stated by the Superintendent of that road to be ten per cent., for the past year, which would make the number of cargoes for this year about 563, and the same rate of increase would double the number in about seven years. No such annual increase as this could be calculated upon if the proposed obstruction should be placed across the harbor.

The Fitchburg Railroad is fifty miles in length, and has a capital stock account of over three and a half millions of dollars, and

carries over its road more than half a million tons of merchandize per annum. The interest of this great corporation in the free navigation of the harbor is further increased by the fact that its freight tracks have been extended along all the deep water wharves in Charlestown below the bridges, and into and through nearly the whole length of the navy yard—which extension is mentioned in the annual report of the corporation for the year 1863, herewith submitted, as follows :

“ By a Legislative act of 1862, the Corporation was authorized to extend its railroad from its then terminus east of Warren Avenue, in Charlestown, to the bounds of the Navy Yard, in that city. Subsequently by orders from Washington, the Railroad was extended into the Navy Yard, so that munitions can now be delivered by continuous Railroad from any of the New England States, the State of New York and the West, into the great Naval Depot of the United States in the East. Furthermore, by this extension about all the deep water in Charlestown, can also be reached by the railroad, which, with the spacious wharves for vessels of the largest burthen that line the shore at this locality, will enable shippers to transfer merchandize direct from cars to the ship.”

These tracks, as stated by the Directors of the corporation, extend to the wharves above the Navy Yard and below the Charles River Bridge, and provide transportation for all the ice shipped from Charlestown—which is well known to be a large, increasing and important branch of commerce. The importance of the connection of this road with the Navy Yard is beyond question a fact which will be duly appreciated by the Commissioners in connection with the free navigation of the harbor. It is also to be stated in this place, that a branch of the Fitchburg Railroad, known as the Watertown Branch, connects the U. S. Arsenal at Watertown, with the Navy Yard, and of course with the harbor and by means of the harbor with the forts for its defence. It is not necessary, before this Commission, to enlarge upon the importance of these significant connections with the naval and munitionary establishments of the general government.

It will be seen by the statements here made, together with a knowledge of the extensive wharf property of the Fitchburg Railroad, how largely the interests of this corporation, and the vast inland traffic provided for by its tracks, are connected with the free navigation of Boston harbor ; and how disastrously these would be affected by any further obstruction to the commerce of the port. The Fitchburg road is, in fact, the great wharf of a large section of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and to a considerable extent by its interior connections, of portions of the States of New Hampshire and Vermont, and the property and capital invested in its operations, connected with the commerce of the harbor, amounts at this time, to millions of dollars.

BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.

Many of the statements which have been made in reference to the Fitchburg Railroad Corporation, and its relations to the commerce of the harbor of Boston, are equally applicable to the business of this corporation. Its freight houses are mostly within the limits of the city, from which all merchandize not intended for shipping is delivered, and where also such merchandize as comes to it by land conveyance, is received. But, as is the case with the Fitchburg Railroad, its roadway across the river, built on piles, is five rods wide, and this, besides the large wharves of the corporation is allowed by the legislature to be used for wharf purposes as regards every description of merchandize and material intended to be transported over the Company's railroad. With the limitation mentioned, the whole space at the disposition of the two corporations is fully occupied, and means of transportation have to be annually increased to enable the companies to do their large freight business.

The interior traffic of the Boston and Maine Railroad Corporation is through an entirely different section of the State from that of the Fitchburg line, reaching as it does by its main track, and branch roads, portions of the State of New Hampshire. It is, like the Fitchburg and other railroads touching the tide-waters of the

harbor, the great wharf-privilege of a country of more than a hundred miles in extent, at which all the heavy and bulky water-borne freight, such as coal, lumber, plaster of Paris, lime, pig iron, salt, &c., &c., is received. This immense amount of freight, consisting of fuel and raw material for the general use of the population, for farming and more especially for manufacturing purposes, as we have already intimated, were the navigation of Charles River to be closed, could not be received on any wharves of the harbor within the limits of the city proper, and would be compelled to seek some other place of deposit and some other route to the consumers. The wharf property and space in Boston harbor is very limited; the English steamers, it is well known, could not obtain wharf accommodations in the city proper, and for some time the Glasgow line found accommodations at the Charlestown wharves; and it is very clear that the ample wharf accommodations of Charles River, and those to a large extent to be developed on the shores of Mystic River, are absolutely indispensable to the commerce of the District. These would be rendered less available, and to some extent almost wholly worthless, by the creation of further obstacles to the free navigation of the two rivers, so providentially located, so essential to the harbor, and so necessary to its commerce.

On the line of the Boston and Maine Railroad, as upon the line of all the great railroads terminating in Boston, are located not merely large manufacturing establishments of various kinds, but manufacturing cities and towns, like the cities of Lawrence, Lowell, and the towns of Haverhill, Melrose and others. With all these the tide-water of Boston harbor is a valuable consideration, and with many of them, the facilities of navigation and transportation, now enjoyed, formed a principal element in determining their location. Any additional obstruction in Boston harbor would be more or less embarrassing and injurious to their business, by increasing the cost of the raw material and transportation and giving advantages to rival establishments more favorably located. So that these parties, the recipients and participants in the commerce of Boston, have thereby a direct interest in the preservation of Boston harbor.

They have invested large sums of money, upon the faith of the government, under whose paramount care the navigable waters of the harbor and the facilities afforded to commerce, are presumed to be secure; and hardly a greater wrong could be done to them and the railroad corporations interested, than in the attempt to take away from them or abridge, the rights and privileges, which, according to Vattel, "every man inherits from Nature and cannot be justly forced to purchase," and which they have in common with others so long enjoyed.

The Boston and Maine railroad has a capital stock amounting to \$4,155,700, and carried in 1867, over three hundred and forty thousand tons of merchandize over its road.

Herewith is submitted a brief statement from the President of the Boston and Maine Railroad corporation, relative to a portion of their inland freight, received at their wharves by water, and of fuel and materials, received in the same way for the use of the corporation in their workshops and in the construction and operation of their road. This statement shows that there arrived at the wharves of the company, above three bridges during the year ending June 1, 1868, two hundred and twenty-six vessels, including sixty-one cargoes of coal and railroad material for the company, and one hundred and sixty-five, cargoes (of which one hundred and thirty-four were coal,) for transportation over the road.

WHARF OWNERS OF CHARLESTOWN.

REMONSTRANCE.

The undersigned owners and occupants of wharves in the city of Charlestown hereby protest against the erection of the Maverick Bridge across Boston harbor from Boston proper to the island of East Boston, for the following reasons, viz:

1. That it will be destructive of the commerce and navigation of the District of Boston and Charlestown by placing a barrier across the central portion of the harbor, obstructing navigation and promoting the filling up of the channel.

2. That it will contract the wharfage and anchorage of the harbor for merchant vessels more than one half (exclusive of the

Navy Yard,) and tend to reduce the commercial city of Boston to a third class seaport.

3. That as a barrier shutting in the Navy Yard from all free access to the sea, it will render that great national establishment comparatively useless and cause its abandonment at great cost and sacrifice to the government.

4. That it will, for reasons already stated, greatly impair the value of our wharf property and improvements by rendering them comparatively useless for commercial purposes.

5. That it will take away from the undersigned the rights and privileges of free access to the ocean over the great highway open to the whole world, which we and the property we represent have enjoyed for more than two hundred years.

6. That said proposed bridge will impose heavy damages and injuries upon the general government, the Commonwealth and individuals, absolutely confiscating the property of these parties, without any absolute demand set forth by the legislature of "public convenience and necessity," and without providing for any compensation.

For these and other reasons, not herein stated, we object to and protest against the erection of the proposed bridge.

W. W. Wheildon for Sawyer & Hovey's wharf.	Franklin Hopkins, Jr.
Gardner Prouty, Agent Damon's wharf.	G. & G. Williams.
Henry Lyon.	J. W. Brooks.
P. J. Stone.	Powers & Edwards.
Timothy T. Sawyer.	John Gary.
Mystic River Corporation, by J. E. Bartlett, President.	Jacob Hittinger.
Fitchburg Railroad Corporation by Wm. B. Stearns, President.	Tudor Co., by H. C. Minot, Treasurer.
Boston & Maine R. R. Co., by F. Cogswell, President.	James Adams.
J. T. & F. L. Gilman.	George B. Parks.
Edmands & Co.	Amos Stone.
Mass. Glass Co. by G. H. Smith, Superintendent.	James Dana.
	Chester Guild & Sons.
	Nathan Tufts, Jr.
	Fred. J. Williams.
	Oakman & Eldridge.
	F. M. Holmes & Co.
	S. H. Fall.

Charlestown, August 23, 1868.

COMMERCE OF CHARLESTOWN.

Of all the municipalities and corporations interested in Boston Harbor and the Commerce of the port, not excepting the city of Boston, Charlestown is the most to be affected and the most to be injured by the erection of the proposed Maverick Bridge — for it shuts her off completely from the sea. Almost surrounded by tide water, it is a remarkable fact that every foot of her shores, on either river, is accessible to navigation and is improved to a greater or less extent in the interest of commerce. The first vessel ever built upon these shores was built by Governor Winthrop as early as 1631, within the limits of Charlestown, the record of which in Winthrop's History of New England, reads as follows :

1631. “ July 4. The Governor built a bark at Mystick which was launched this day, and called The Blessing of the Bay.”

This was one hundred and forty-four years before the Declaration of American Independence, and from that time to this — two hundred and thirty-seven years — Charlestown has enjoyed and her commerce profitted by a free and unobstructed communication with the sea. This, therefore, is not merely her constitutional right, or her right by possession and enjoyment, but in a sense peculiar to herself, her inestimable birth-right. The entire population of this city — not alone the wharf owners who have protested against the obstruction — is interested in its commercial character ; and are to be affected, both generally and individually, by every facility and every obstruction to the commerce of the port. The city itself in its corporate capacity, in the interest of its schools, water-works and public institutions, as well as its inhabitants, is dependent for its supplies of coal, wood, lumber, lime, grain, flour and a hundred other articles of heavy and bulky merchandize, upon that commerce which brings all these water-borne to her wharves — not to mention, in this connection, the very large foreign commerce carried on in the interest of Boston merchants, nor yet the large export trade in ice, both of which give employment to the

inhabitants and are essential elements in the prosperity of the city. There are also in the city many large manufacturing establishments with an aggregate capital of several millions of dollars, each one of which is interested in the commerce of the city and will be affected injuriously by any further obstructions to navigation. The commercial facilities of Charles River, now improved nearly to their full extent, as has been shown to the Board, attention has been directed to Mystic River, where a commercial railroad and wharves below Chelsea Bridge, are already in process of construction. Before many years both shores of this river will be wholly devoted to commerce.

BOSTON HARBOR AND ITS COMMERCE.

In view of the limited accommodations of Boston harbor, the wharves and shores of Charlestown are daily becoming more necessary and more valuable. To shut out any portion of this from the sea forever, and thus contract the harbor to a still greater degree, if it were intended to destroy it and break up its commerce, would be effectual for such a purpose; but with its present commerce, the known enterprise and energy of its merchants, its limited space of anchorage, wharfage and storage, and in view of what has already been done and is now in progress for the enlargement of these, it is certain that no reasonable views of the commercial interests of the harbor, the State or the nation, can possibly justify the erection of the proposed bridge. No appliances of steam power, no contrivances of rafting or scowing, nothing in fact within the power of man to create, it is believed, can save with another bridge, the commerce of the inland towns; which, while it continues, is considered on all hands, a relief to the pressure upon the harbor and wharf accommodations of Boston. A bridge—it may almost as well be a dam—across the central portion of Boston harbor, as against the commerce of the port, can have but one effect; and the assertion that it would be beneficial to commerce must have been simply a figure of speech. Such an assertion could only be seriously made where pretence is paramount. Those who dare all things will hardly dare this; and

that credulity which grows by what it feeds on, will scarcely echo so bold a statement. It is the policy of Congress to encourage commerce, as it encourages agriculture and manufactures, the twin industries of the people; and it is the policy of nations to keep open and unobstructed the highways of the seas. The interests of the people; the interests of the government; sound policy, wise legislation, public law, all combine in judgment everywhere and under all circumstances against unnecessary obstructions to navigation.

Not to dwell longer on these particulars, it has been made manifest to the Commission that not merely Boston or Charlestown, but the whole Commonwealth of Massachusetts and even communities beyond the borders of the State, are interested and it would seem, have rights in the free navigation of the great central harbor of New England. It is to some extent the port of entry for this cluster of States; its shores are their wharf accommodations; and the store-houses of the city are vast granaries and depots of supply for all of them. Those of us who are here today to oppose the obstruction contemplated, are sustained in the belief that while we are endeavoring to protect and preserve the interests and rights of the people in whose behalf we address this Commission, we are contemplating no wrong to any other parties. We seek no new advantage; our position is defensive; our object the best public good. In the language of the eminent gentleman at the head of the United States Coast Survey, whose communication I had the honor to place upon your files on Monday, we believe "that while the proposed bridge *may be* a small local benefit, it must be a *great* public injury."

UNITED STATES NAVY YARD.

The second point of inquiry charged upon the Commission is as to the effect of the proposed bridge upon the interests of the government in the Navy Yard at Charlestown—in which also the whole Commonwealth of Massachusetts is interested. The distinguished gentlemen of the navy sitting upon this Commission, and the eminent officer of the Engineer Corps associated with

them, need no suggestions on this subject from those who in language more specific than polished, are to be considered as "outsiders." The great value, the great importance, the great capacity and completeness of this naval station, and its admirable location and adaptation to all the wants and purposes of the general government, are well known and appreciated by the Commission, and nothing that we can say will add to their estimation of it as a whole. They know as well as it can be known, how comparatively valueless all this would be without a perfectly free and unobstructed highway, adequate to all its purposes, to and from the sea. They know more surely than we know, that government would not, and could not, continue to use and improve the navy yard as now without such a highway; and they know, too, what the yard would be sure to become in case the proposed bridge should be built.

If, therefore, the government shall determine to have no more of its ships built, repaired or re-fitted at this navy yard; to abandon its use in these respects, and to maintain it only as a foundry and workshop and ropewalk,—an establishment to be used in these particulars, in national emergencies,—the interests of the United States against building the proposed bridge would be in so far lessened. But as the matter stands today, with this important, costly and valuable national establishment, almost as complete as money, genius, skill and the indomitable efforts of man can make it, nothing but the most absolute necessity, not possible to be endured or avoided, will justify its spoliation or destruction. This, however, is a contingency which the Commission is not called upon to consider, and which, it does not appear that Congress itself contemplates. If the bridge proposed to be built were across Miller's Creek, or above Chelsea Bridge, or over the water between the city of Chelsea and the island of East Boston, in no way interfering with the main channel of the harbor, then the Commission could readily make report to Congress that it would not directly, perhaps in any manner, affect the interests of the United States in the Navy Yard at Charlestown. But the erection of a monstrous gateway between the Navy Yard and the open sea, is to say the least of it, a very different and a more serious thing: not only immediately

and directly affecting the interests of the United States in the navy yard, but absolutely rendering it comparatively unserviceable and worthless to the government. The essential thing to a navy, the essential thing to a navy yard, above all other physical and geographical necessities, is sea-room, free and unobstructed access to the ocean; and this in the location of the Charlestown Navy Yard was, beyond all question, the first thing considered, and without this, clear and unquestionable, it never would have been located in Massachusetts.

The land comprising the Navy Yard, now only in part, was originally some forty-two or three acres in extent—mostly purchased from the owners, and partly, (though in small part only,) taken in legal form upon the appraisement of a jury. As the general government in such cases deals only with the sovereign State, jurisdiction over the territory was ceded to the United States by act of legislature in June, 1800. Since that time a small portion of adjoining wharf property on the south-westerly side, has been purchased and the territory of the Navy Yard is now estimated, including flats which have been filled up in the lapse of years, at eighty-three acres. It has required in the ordinary progress of so great an enterprise, nearly seventy years to create such an establishment, capable of doing the work required by the government, to say nothing of the many millions of dollars expended in its enlargement and improvement. The value of the buildings and yard today is not less than thirty millions of dollars, and the magnificent dry dock alone, were it to be built at this time, would add many millions to this amount. In four years, from 1861 to 1865, the work done at this Navy Yard for the government, in building, repairing and re-fitting vessels of war, in cordage, ordnance supplies, &c., by an approximate estimate, required the expenditure of nearly twenty millions of dollars.

These brief statements as to the territory, capacity and completeness of the Navy Yard afford to those not acquainted to some extent with its location and general character, a very imperfect idea of such an establishment; nevertheless, they indicate how from its location to the present time, it has been regarded

by the government, and with what purpose it has been made the recipient of so much interest and the object of such large expenditures of labor and capital. To the Commonwealth of Massachusetts it is of peculiar interest and importance—at once her armament and her ornament; the defence of her capital and the insignia of her rank. It is here in right of her revolutionary eminence, as one of the thirteen original States; in compliment to her services; in acknowledgment of her position. It is her right arm, and marks in the history of the country the glory of her great son, by whose energy and untiring patriotic labors the American navy was founded.* To ask Massachusetts to surrender this establishment is to ask her to go back upon herself; to mar her own history; to give up Plymouth Rock; to level Bunker Hill and demolish the towering shaft which forever sanctifies the first bloody battle-field of the revolution.

Having placed before the Commission various statements in regard to the amount and value of property and commerce to be affected by the proposed bridge, it has not seemed to me necessary, in view of all the testimony now upon your files, to trouble the Commission with any further statements in detail. As well as I am able to judge, the whole ground has been covered, the whole case completed, so far at least as the opponents of the bridge are concerned—for any deficiencies on the other side, the case itself must be responsible. This bridge, if ever built under the act of the legislature, must be built by the concurrent action of three distinct parties, only one of which is before this Board in favor of it. The Harbor Commissioners are here in impregnable opposition to the measure; the Mayor and Aldermen of Boston, now that we understand that matter, are not here at all. So that, so far as this Commission is concerned, they can know of only one party out of the three in support of the bridge; and that party is perfectly helpless without the concurrence of the other two. This, if I understand the counsel correctly, is their own interpretation of the law; and this is made more apparent by their failure to present a plan and location of the proposed structure, required by the

* John Adams.

Commission and essential to the inquiry authorized by Congress. If the three parties were acting in concurrence, these would have been promptly furnished; as they now stand opposed to each other the thing is impossible, and this impossibility, we have a right to conclude, is the reason why a plan, location and description of the proposed bridge, have not been furnished in compliance with the order of the Commission on the first day of its sitting.

On the other side, I submit, the case is complete and the testimony conclusive: it cannot be met, nor controverted, nor questioned: there it stands in solid array, and includes all that science, skill and judgment, in the highest positions of intelligence and responsibility can furnish to throw the light of wisdom and experience upon the subject.

And now, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Commission, in concluding these remarks, permit me to say, that the case presented to the Commission by the strength of the authorities, clearness of convictions, directness and force of the testimony; the vast interests to be affected; rights to be violated; commerce to be destroyed — altogether, is so strong, so complete, and so overwhelming, as to justify the epithet “suicidal,” applied to the measure by the Harbor Commissioners.

If anything could possibly justify the remissness of the parties, while the bill was before the legislature, the gross wrong, the gross absurdity, and if it were respectful, I would say, the gross effrontery, of the scheme, as made manifest before this Commission, would alone do so, and must go far to palliate their neglect. It was hardly possible for the intelligent parties who have appeared before this Commission to realize that a measure so fraught with wrong, so prolific of evil, was seriously contemplated; and its partial success is due to the boldness and audacity of the scheme.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

MEMORIAL TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

CHARLESTOWN, AUGUST 19, 1868.

TO THE HONORABLE GIDEON WELLES,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:—

The undersigned citizens of Charlestown, aware of your official visit to the Navy Yard of the United States, in this city, respectfully ask your attention to the subject of the proposed Maverick Bridge and the contingent suggestion of the removal or discontinuance of the Navy Yard. The act of the legislature authorizing the Maverick Bridge was passed towards the close of the session, by a barely constitutional majority, against the earnest protest of the Governor of the State; and is unquestionably a measure adverse to the interests of the city of Boston, as a commercial port, and still more directly injurious to the property and prosperity of the cities of Charlestown and Chelsea. Under these circumstances, in view of the present and prospective importance of the port of Boston, as one of the chief commercial depots of the country, we cannot err in the statement that the erection of the proposed structure would be unwise, against the opinions and wishes of the people, and equally against the prosperity and commercial importance of the State.

The great consideration that the bridge will be an obstruction to the free navigation of the harbor, is so overwhelming in itself

that it is almost unnecessary to refer to the details or statistics of property and trade, sure to be affected injuriously, if not utterly destroyed by its erection: including as it would, the almost immediate abandonment by the government of one of its most complete and costly naval establishments, justly the pride of the country, renowned in its history and reliable in its greatest emergencies. The Department through which the vast sums appropriated by Congress, for the completion of this great naval establishment, have been expended, cannot ignore its commanding location, its means for doing the work of the government, the cost of its removal and the great interests, State and national, which would thereby be sacrificed. No advantages which may be claimed to result from the proposed structure, are to be found adequate to justify a measure so unwise and destructive. If its effects were limited to the Navy Yard alone, and were in fact no detriment to the city of Boston itself, to Charlestown and the already embarrassed commercial interests of the more inland cities and towns, the single consideration that it destroyed one of the finest naval establishments of the country, for no adequate advantage to other interests, would be paramount against its erection. So that, equally destructive to the interests of government and the interests of commerce, a scheme so fraught with injury to both, cannot receive either the consent of the people, or the countenance of the government.

We have said that there was no absolute demand for the Maverick Bridge: East Boston is situated with regard to Boston almost precisely as the city of Brooklyn is with regard to New York — with this difference — the former may be reached by land conveyance through Charlestown and Chelsea from Boston, and the latter cannot be so reached, under any emergency, from New York. The ferry-boats, in each case, capable of carrying everything that offers, ply regularly at all times of the day or night, at rates but little higher than the average tolls of bridges, and if not ample to serve the demands of public travel and transportation, are easily to be increased. Nothing beyond East Boston, having a *free* route by land through Charlestown now, would be materially benefitted by

the proposed bridge, but would participate in the general damage it would impose upon the commerce of the metropolitan city.

The harbor of Boston has heretofore been an object of consideration and care on the part of the government, and large sums have been expended by it in its survey, in the exploration and preservation of its basins and estuaries, in the care of its islands and the maintenance of its channels; and at the present time, is engaged in deepening its channels and removing obstructions which may impede or impair the commerce of the city. Yet it is apparent to the eye, even to the thought, of all who know the topography of the inner harbor of Boston, that nature, nor all the powers of the tempest or washing away of the islands, has ever placed any obstacles to its free navigation for vessels of every tonnage, equal to that contemplated by the erection of Maverick Bridge. It is in this sense, a measure opposed to all improvement, rendering comparatively valueless all that has heretofore been done for the benefit of the harbor. It is as if an almost completed enterprise of gigantic magnitude and of immense utility for all coming time, were to be blasted or at least restricted, instead of being perfected. No filling up of basins or estuaries, not even the filling up of the main channel of the harbor, would be so detrimental to the commerce of the city of Boston, as the building of this bridge — for these would all be susceptible of remedy or removal, which a bridge once built, would not be. There is no avoiding the conclusion that it would be an obstruction not to be abated by dredging, not to be destroyed by blasting, closing up for all time, the largest, most important and by far the most valuable portion of the harbor for all naval and commercial purposes.

It is not alone any narrowness or obstructions in the channels, or any filling up of estuaries, that has engaged the attention and effort of government and people; but the restricted limits of the harbor itself, the limited water frontage, and still more stringent limits of deep water accommodations, both for wharfage and anchorage, have engaged the attention of the State and city authorities and the merchants. With a view to the extension and enlargement of these, various plans and large enterprises

have been undertaken, and at the present time, others involving vast labor and enormous outlays, are contemplated by the authorities of the State and private corporations—the particulars and details of which,—so well known in this community,—may be readily furnished. Under these circumstances, in view of the growth of the country and the expansion of its population over the vast inland areas of the West; in view of its increasing commerce with other countries; the vast accumulations of produce and manufactures to be exported, and the even greater quantities of manufactured goods and raw material to be imported to meet the growing demands of the country; when all the capacities of commerce, all the tonnage of the country, are sure to be required to meet the emergencies, it seems incredible that parties should be found, from whatever motives of personal aggrandizement, who desire to abridge these means, or a State legislature, acting for the interests of the whole people, that should afford them any encouragement. The whole tendency of the measure proposed, ostensibly for the benefit of a small population, justly seeking facilities which they deem advantageous, is to reduce absolutely and essentially, the commercial advantages and the commercial importance of the city and the State, sacrificing the larger interests to the lesser and the general interests of the whole to the private benefit of the few. In view of the true policy of the State—if anything pertaining to the policy of a thoughtful and nurturing government could have been recognized at all—to say that the act is simply suicidal, is to characterize it in the mildest terms of reproach. Today, tomorrow, every day, the true interests of Boston, and therefore of the Commonwealth, and therefore of the nation, is to encourage, enlarge and extend the commerce of the country, and by every means in the power of government facilitate its transactions and promote its growth. No other policy can govern an intelligent and progressive people; no other policy can promote their prosperity, elevate their civilization, extend their influence and promote the common welfare.

The portion of the harbor of Boston to be affected by the Maverick Bridge is by far, for purposes of commerce, its most valuable por-

tion. Almost any number of bridges in the southerly section of the city, across the narrow channel which passes along its wharves, would be nearly harmless compared with the one bridge contemplated. From a point in the harbor, near the end of Central Wharf, to the spacious basin lying between the northerly end of Boston, the cities of Charlestown and Chelsea and East Boston, (the channel of separation, in fact, between Boston and its island Ward,) the lineal distance is about forty-five hundred feet, and included in this space is the deepest water of the harbor; and the only part of the harbor excepting the channel to the sea, where large vessels can lie at anchor. It is the opinion of Com. Rodgers, Commandant of the Charlestown Navy Yard, that no large merchant or naval vessel can venture to anchor within five hundred feet of the line of the bridge on either side of it, which together with the width of the bridge and piers, would take from the forty-five hundred feet of anchorage ground at least one-third of the whole, leaving, it is probable, the larger space *above* the bridge. It would thus not only destroy the proper but limited anchorage ground of the harbor for the larger class of vessels, but also leave by far the larger portion of the wharf property of the city itself above the bridge. All the wharves in Charlestown, (at any one of which a man-of-war will float at low water,) all the wharves in Chelsea and two-thirds of those at East Boston, together with the Navy Yard, would be shut out from any convenient access to the sea. Nor is this all: the commerce of the city of Charlestown, above the present bridges, of the city of Cambridge and towns on Charles River, is represented in the statement that over eighteen thousand passages of vessels per annum are made through the draws of existing bridges; and these together with not less than six thousand other passages of vessels going up to Chelsea and Mystic River, and thousands more to the neighboring wharves of Boston and East Boston, would be compelled to pass through the draw, or draws, (for one would not accommodate the commerce it would obstruct,) of the proposed bridge. It can be no exaggeration, we think, to say that not less than three-fourths of the entire tonnage of Boston, foreign and domestic, would be compelled to

pass through the draws of the Maverick Bridge, should it ever be built, — this, until the commerce of the port dwindles down to fishing vessels alone, the bridge itself cannot accommodate. How much the commerce of Boston and Charlestown would be likely to increase under these circumstances, it would not be difficult to calculate; how rapidly it would diminish would be a still more obvious problem.

With respect to the removal of the Navy Yard, or its discontinuance as a government establishment, we presume either alternative to be dependent upon the free navigation of its waters and unobstructed access to its wharves and workshops, — without which, beyond question, it would be comparatively useless to the government and comparatively worthless as a means of defence to the people. The Charlestown Navy Yard was one of the earliest foundations of the government preparatory to the formation of its great arm of national defence, now so efficient, — the Navy. The interest taken in the enterprise by the citizens of Charlestown, at the time, and the sacrifices made in its behalf, were accepted by the government as assurances of the patriotic feelings of the people and their devotion to the best interests of the country. We may add that the wisdom of the location then made, in the chief commercial port of the country, has been demonstrated through a series of seventy years and by large sums of money expended by the government for its completion and the development of its capacities. So that today, unless we have been misadvised, the Charlestown Navy Yard may safely challenge comparison, in many important particulars, with any similar depot in the world. Its spacious dock, its foundry and ropewalk, its ample workshops, ship-houses and storehouses, are available to an extraordinary extent by their very compactness as by their complete and substantial character.

To destroy such an establishment — the growth of nearly three-quarters of a century, under the most liberal appropriations of the government, now representing tens of millions of dollars in its real property and material — completed and almost perfected in some of its departments; capable of meeting the largest and the most

pressing demands of the government—seems so unwise and ill-advised, that we do not know how to characterize it by any single epithet in the language; and we presume, under other circumstances, never would be contemplated by the government. It seems impossible that such a result could have been considered; and we do but repeat a large public judgment when we say that intelligent gentlemen are unwilling to believe, even with the grant of the legislature, before them, that the work proposed can ever be accomplished. To create such an establishment as the Charlestown Navy Yard—to say nothing of its location, of the facilities of transportation with all parts of the country and for the attainment of its supplies—has been the work of more than two generations. Its destruction is not a matter to be lightly contemplated or capriciously disposed of. It is in fact a question of great interest to the nation and the State. The Navy Yard has become identified not merely with the city of Charlestown, or the city of Boston, but with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and all her interests, manufacturing, commercial and industrial, and she has a right to look upon it as one of the evidences of her importance and the means of her defence. Its establishment was a compliment to her position and services, her commercial importance and growing greatness. Without presuming to urge her claims upon the general government, we may be allowed to say that she has done nothing, unless it be the act we condemn, to forfeit its respect and confidence.

Entertaining these views of the questions considered, in common, we believe, with the mass of our people—and feeling how deeply the determination of them will affect a large portion of our community, who are from their position wholly uninformed in regard to them—we have felt it to be due to them, just and proper on our part, and respectful to the Head of the Navy Department of the country, to present them in this form.

We remain, with assurances of our high respect and consideration, your obedient servants.

[Signed by LIVERUS HULL, Mayor of Charlestown, and a number of other citizens, and presented to the Secretary of the Navy on the occasion of his visit to the Navy Yard.]

EXTRACT FROM THE SPEECH OF JAMES B. FRANCIS,
OF LOWELL.

“The great objections to the bridge are its interference with commerce and the Navy Yard. A very large part of the vessels entering Boston harbor go above the ferries, near which the bridge is proposed to be built. It appeared that last year about 16,500 vessels passed the draw bridges above the proposed site for the bridge, and that about as many more stopped at the various wharves between the proposed site and the draw bridges, making about 33,000 vessels which passed the proposed site last year, say one hundred per day on an average. * * * *

“An average of one hundred vessels a day passing the draw, will be a serious interruption to the travel over the bridge. From the experience at Providence, Albany and Chicago, the petitioners attempted to show that by the use of steam power, the time required for the opening and shutting of the draw and the passage of a vessel would not exceed three minutes; I do not think they make sufficient allowance for the prodigious size of the proposed draw, which is four hundred feet long and seventy-five feet wide: more than twice the length of this State House, and a quarter part wider than this hall; it will cover nearly three-quarters of an acre, and its weight cannot be less than a thousand tons, and probably nearer two thousand. This enormous mass cannot be started or stopped suddenly. Then again, time must be given to clear the bridge of teams and passengers before the opening is commenced; this will require at least two minutes. So that if we take the time required for opening and shutting, and passing a vessel, at three minutes, as the petitioners claim, which I think is much less than it will average, we shall have five minutes' interruption to the travel at the passage of each vessel, making an average of five hundred

minutes per day, or eight hours and twenty minutes, that the travel will be interrupted. * * * *

Clearly, one of two things must be the result if this bridge is built : either the interruption to travel over the bridge will be very great or there will be great interference to the free movement of vessels, and consequent injury to commerce. Both interests will probably suffer to a serious extent, but commerce I fear will suffer the most.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR PEIRCE.

To the Honorable the Commissioners of the United States upon the establishment of the Maverick Bridge, the undersigned respectfully states :

That, having regarded the commission as especially intended to obtain an impartial judgment, unbiased by the previous expressions of opinions, and having himself entire confidence in the wisdom and experience of the Board now sitting, and in their acknowledged ability to consider all the questions involved in it, he has thought it more judicious that he should not take a prominent position in reference to the issue. But he trusts that it will be received as a proper performance of his duty if he simply states that he has continued his consideration of the subject with unabated interest, and that his inquiries confirm him in the opinions he has repeatedly given. He believes that no bridge can be built to East Boston which will not delay navigation much more than it will facilitate trade : that for every ton which will be expedited in transit over the bridge, there will be many tons obstructed in the passage through its draws, and that the gain to the real estate of East Boston will be more than equalled by the loss of value of the wharves. The piers of the bridge will be an obstruction to ice, and will serve to keep it accumulating above the bridge, to the manifest injury of a very large commerce. Each pier will also be a contraction of the channel for the flow of water, and will acceler-

ate its velocity, from which would result the same kind of injury as that to which the harbor of Boston has already been subjected, by the bridges across the Mystic and Charles rivers. The scouring influence of the water would be increased and material taken from the bottom in the vicinity of the bridge would be deposited with the previous deposits at those points just where the harbor is most vulnerable.

In one word, then, it would appear that while the proposed bridge may be a small local benefit, it would be a great public injury, and especially injurious to the Navy Yard at Charlestown.

All of which is respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN PEIRCE,

Superintendent U. S. Coast Survey.

Cambridge, Mass., October 3, 1868.

CUSTOM HOUSE, BOSTON. }
Collector's Office, Aug. 28, 1868. }

W. W. WHEILDON, Esq., Dear Sir :

I enclose the figures you desire and would refer you for the details to the annual report of the Board of Trade.

The statistics give a very imperfect idea of the coasting trade, as very few vessels in that trade enter or clear. There are no means of ascertaining the number of vessels that arrive at the port in a year.

I am glad that you are interested in opposing the mad idea of a bridge across the centre of Boston Harbor. If it succeeds, notice should be given that no commerce is wanted at this place. I would also suggest two finger posts, one pointing toward New York and one to Portland.

The bridge is of course for people to go to and from Boston proper to East Boston, but no one will wish to go either way, if we give up our harbor, and lose our commerce.

In haste, I am respectfully,

THOMAS RUSSELL.

BUSINESS OF CHARLESTOWN WHARVES.

TUDOR WHARF COMPANY.

350 to 400 vessels are annually loaded with ice. 60 vessels annually are loaded for India and China. 7 vessels are now on their return, the duties on whose cargoes will amount to \$400,000 in gold. In the protest of the Tudor Company it is stated that "beginning at Lewis's wharf, there are outside of the proposed bridge in Boston proper, 8 deep water wharves; inside 18 in Boston, and 8 in Charlestown—26 in all."

HITTINGER'S WHARF.

200,000 bushels of oats shipped from Hittinger's (Gray's) wharf, in the winter of 1867-8, equal to 40 cargoes of 5000 bushels.

50,000 tons Ice average shipment of ice yearly for past six years, equal to 200 cargoes of 250 tons each.

1,000,000 feet and upwards of lumber passed over the wharf in 1867. 13,200 bales of hay, equal to 44 cargoes of 50 tons.

Before the war the quantity of Ice shipped was nearly double. In addition to the above, cargoes of coal and naval stores, sulphur and other merchandize, are landed on the wharf whenever room can be given for the same.

DAMON'S WHARF.

The business of Damon's Wharf is wharfage and storage of all goods in bond, a large proportion being from the East Indies and Europe. There have arrived at the wharf seventy-one (71) vessels most of them of heavy tonnage with full cargoes, a large number of which were from the East Indies. Also twenty-one (21) vessels, principally of a large class, have received cargoes for South American and European ports. The number of vessels above mentioned is increased by vessels in the domestic or coastwise trade to about two hundred, (200.)

OAKMAN & ELDRIDGE.

150 vessels per year, chiefly with coal, averaging about three hundred and fifty tons each.

ADDISON GAGE & Co.

200 vessels per year. 69,000 tons of Ice shipped, besides sawdust received. Lumber and merchandize of every description to a large amount shipped in the ice vessels.

CHARLESTOWN GAS COMPANY.

15 to 20 vessels, about five thousand (5000) tons of coal per annum, and 4 to 6 vessels with clay, retorts, &c.

CHESTER GUILD & SONS.

30 to 40 vessels per annum, with bark for leather factory, 2500 to 3000 cords per year.

FRANKLIN HOPKINS, Jr.

One vessel a week for nine months. Can accommodate a vessel drawing 15 feet of water. Another bridge would increase cost, &c.

EDMANDS & Co.

25 or 26 vessels on an average per year. 1455 tons of clay, 705 cords of wood, 231 tons of coal.

YOUNG & JOHNSON, Warren Bridge.

275 vessels with lobsters, for the year ending Sept. 1, 1868—causing the draw of Charles River Bridge to be opened 550 times.

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